Appeals court denies rehearing of Havana Docks cruise lawsuitAppeals court denies rehearing of Havana Docks cruise lawsuit

The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals denied Havana Docks' petition for a rehearing or hearing en banc (of the full court) following the panel's 2-1 October ruling largely in favor of cruise companies.

Next stop: Supreme Court

The next stop would be the Supreme Court, according to John Kavulich, president of the US-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, which closely tracks US-Cuba relations.

As per the appeals court's pre-Christmas order:

'The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled, the Petition(s) for Rehearing En Banc filed by Appellee Havana Docks Corporation are DENIED.'

The earlier decision

Earlier the court mostly sided with Carnival Corp., Royal Caribbean Group, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings and MSC Cruises in long-running cases where a US national — Havana Docks — seeks compensation for property confiscated by Cuba's communist government under Title III of the Helms-Burton or Libertad Act.

The court determined the property of Havana Docks confiscated by Cuba was the concession right to operate and profit from the docks for 99 years, which was set to expire in 2004. The facilities were used by the cruise lines from 2016 to 2019. The court said Havana Docks did not own the real property but had the concession right to operate and benefit from the port.

However, the claims against Carnival were remanded for further proceedings based on its use of the docks from 1996 to 2001 (when subsidiary Costa Cruises operated voyages from Havana, which ceased after Carnival completed its acquisition of Costa).

Basis for the appeal

In seeking a rehearing or a hearing by all 12 members of the appeals court, Havana Docks argued the divided panel decision conflicted with Glen v. Club Méditerranée, SA and 'involves the following question of exceptional importance: Whether the Libertad Act imposes liability for trafficking in property that the plaintiff hypothetically would have owned had the Cuban government not confiscated it, as opposed to property that the plaintiff actually owned at the time of confiscation and reflected in a claim against the Cuban government.'